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INTRODUCTION 
Respondent, William R. Shupe, ("Respondent") sets forth the 
essential procedural and factual background which has led to Bar 
Counsel's filing of this appeal: 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule XIV (a) of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, Article VIII, Section 4 of the 
Utah Constitution and Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2 (3) (c). 
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. In 1991, a screening panel, appointed by the Utah State 
Bar (the "Bar"), met and reviewed the facts surrounding matters F-
19 and F-20 and subsequently determined to file formal complaints 
on both matters. 
2. Subsequently thereto, the Utah State Bar, in conjunction 
with Bar Counsel appointed a Disciplinary Hearing Panel, comprised 
of Mr. Harold L. Petersen and Ms. Barbara K. Polich, both 
experienced attorneys in good standing with the Utah State Bar, who 
had acted in such capacities prior to this time. 
3. Respondent had no say or voice in the appointment of the 
members to the Disciplinary Hearing Panel (referred to hereinafter 
as the "Panel"). The Panel was simply appointed by the Bar. It is 
Respondent's understanding that such panel members are volunteers 
who perform their service to benefit the Bar and the community of 
lawyers in general. 
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4. On or about, June 24, 1992, the first hearing was 
initiated in this case. Respondent appeared telephonically and 
testimony was taken by both parties. 
5. The Panel then continued the hearing to July 20, 1992, 
with the understanding that all records on behalf of all parties be 
lodged prior to the hearing. 
6. The second hearing convened on or about July 20, 1992, and 
prior to attempts by both Respondent and Bar Counsel, the necessary 
records did not arrive and the hearing was continued to August 3, 
1992. 
7. on August 3, 1992 the hearing was convened. After taking 
some testimony, it was apparent that the financial records had not 
arrived, again, from West One's bank in Boise, Idaho (where 
Respondent's trust account records were kept). At this time, both 
Mr. Peterson and Ms. Polich stated on the record that a continuance 
should be granted in order to obtain all records in order to make 
a proper finding. 
8. On page forty-three of the Transcription of the Hearings, 
Mr. Peterson stated that he and Ms. Polich wanted to make it "clear 
to both parties that [they saw] this as a very serious matter. 
That the things that have actually been alleged, if true, could 
have some very serious consequences." He then stated that they saw 
the potential for a very serious outcome if the allegations are 
found to be true. 
9. The Panel then stated that the hearing would "go forth in 
a more formal manner so the evidence will come out clearly." 
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(Transcription of Hearings, page 43) 
10. At the August 3, 1992 hearing, the Panel held that a 
default in F-20 had been entered; that certain evidence had been 
deemed admitted in F-20; and that the Panel's findings and 
recommendations would center around sanctions in F-20 
(Transcription of Hearings, pages 43-48). 
11. The Panel also stated that it wanted all facts and 
records submitted by both parties before it made its recommendation 
(transcription of Hearings, pages 43-48). 
12. On or about October, 15, 1992, the continued hearing was 
convened. At that time all testimony was heard from all interested 
parties. Bar Counsel did not object on any procedural grounds to 
any of the hearings, its authority and/or the quality or nature of 
evidence submitted. 
13. On or about, November 24, 1992, the Panel handed down its 
"Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the Hearing Panel." 
14. The Recommendations of the Panel for sanctions with 
respect to F-20 were as follows: 
A. Probation for one (1) year; 
B. Respondent to limit practice to one location (either 
Utah or California) during the probationary period; 
C. Respondent not to establish any "attorney/client 
trust account" as a sole signatory; 
D. Respondent to reimburse Bryant Cragun the sum of 
$13,000 within six (6) months of the commencement of the 
probationary period. 
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E. Respondent to complete three (3) hours of continuing 
education or pass the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Exam. 
F. Respondent not to take any new Utah clients during 
the probationary period. 
15. The recommendation of the Panel with respect to F-19 was 
that the amount paid to Respondent was meant as a "personal bonus"; 
and that no sanctions be assessed in this matter. A copy of the 
Finds of the Panel is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
16. Subsequent thereto, Bar Counsel filed papers with the 
Board of Bar Commissioners setting forth the trial brief filed at 
the time of the hearing of this matter; and a request that the 
Panel's Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations be avoided and 
that a new panel be appointed to review this entire matter. 
17. On or about January 21, 1993, the Board of Bar 
Commissioners voted to affirm the Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendation of the Panel. A copy of the finds of the Board is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B," and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
18. The documents attached to Bar Counsel's Docketing 
Statement and Appellant's Brief are essentially the same 
information, pleadings, caselaw and exhibits that the Panel and the 
Board of Commissioners reviewed prior to their findings and 
affirmations. 
STATEMENT OF RESPONDENT 
As set forth above, the facts and procedural information 
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surrounding matters F-19 and F-20 have been thoroughly reviewed and 
evaluated by respected individuals, selected by the Bar. 
In compliance with the Findings, Respondent has taken the following 
action, in order to be incompliance therewith: 
1. Consolidated all work to California for the next year. 
This has required Respondent to lease a condominium in Irvine , 
California at great expense; 
2. Closed any and all attorney/client trust accounts; 
3. Registered to take six (6) hours of professional 
responsibility with the California State Bar; 
4. Not accepted any new Utah clients; and 
5. Prepared to reimburse Bryant Cragun within six (6) months 
of the commencement of the probationary period. 
In this case, it appears that, even though Bar Counsel has 
been involved in this matter form the beginning; and even though 
Bar Counsel agreed to the appointment of the members of the Panel; 
and even though Bar Counsel works under the purview of the Board of 
Commissioners; Bar Counsel is not pleased with the recommendations 
of the Panel and affirmations of the Board and seeks another trial 
in this case. 
There are no procedural miscues to which this appeal is taken; 
there are no improprieties in the evidence that were properly 
objected to; there are no properly lodged objections at any time in 
this proceeding which would give basis to this appeal. Rather, Bar 
Counsel is not satisfied with the Findings and thereby alleges that 
the actions of the Panel and impliedly the Board, were "arbitrary, 
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capricious, or erroneous." The individuals who made these 
determinations arrived at the same after careful study and 
consideration of the evidence, testimony of all parties and 
exhibits. The Board then reviewed the same materials; evaluated 
the Findings; and elected to affirm the same. These are not 
capricious, or arbitrary acts. The findings were based upon 
careful findings and not erroneous assumptions. 
Based on the foregoing, Respondent respectfully requests the 
Supreme Court to deny Bar Counsel's appeal in this matter and allow 
the commencement of the Probationary Period. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE PANEL98 FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO F-19 ARE CONSISTENT 
WITH THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE EVIDENCE 
The Panel's finding that a payment of approximately $4,000 to 
be a personal bonus to Respondent is consistent with the testimony 
and evidence in this matter. Appendix H, attached to Appellant's 
Brief is the Affidavit of Blaine Savage. This affidavit was 
accepted by both parties in lieu of Mr. Savage's testimony. 
On page 2 of Mr. Savage's affidavit, he states: "As I 
prepared to pay my final legal bill of approximately $4,500 ($6,000 
less the $1,500 I had already paid) I told me Shupe that I wanted 
to pay the $10,000 I had budgeted and he could consider the excess 
a bonus for his good work [emphasis added]. I was aware that this 
payment was in excess of the billing, but I felt the law firm was 
receiving the full amount of its billed fees with the final $4,500 
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payment." By testifying that he knew the firm was receiving the 
payment of its full billing, Mr. Savage's intent that the balance 
was to be a "personal bonus" to Mr. Shupe for his "good work," is 
made clear. 
With regards to repentant statements made by Respondent, 
Respondent has never denied that he has an obligation to his former 
law firm. However, despite the testimony of Messrs. Dunn and 
Linebaugh, Respondent never "confessed" that he had taken the 
money; but rather explained his rendition of the facts and the 
reasons for his treating the excess payment as a personal bonus. 
Respondent has consistently stated that the law firm received the 
full benefit of its bargain with respect to the work performed for 
Mr. Savage. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Respondent has also stated 
throughout all hearings that he should have gone to the law firm 
and disclosed the events surrounding the giving of the bonus. 
Because of this failure, Respondent admitted that his actions were 
not as they should have been and he agreed to repay to amount of 
the bonus plus interest; and in fact has repaid the principal 
amount of the bonus payment. 
Furthermore, before coming to an agreement with his former law 
firm on this matter, Respondent testified (which testimony was 
corroborated Mr. Linebaugh) that he visited with bar counsel, 
Christine Burdick, and explained the entire situation to her. She 
informed Respondent that this was a matter between Respondent and 
his former law firm and that the bar was not going to get involved 
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in this matter. After respondent made his agreement with his 
former law firm, a complaint was filed after he failed to make two 
interest payments, but which interest payments were subsequently 
made. 
IX 
THE TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE IN F-20 ARE CONSISTENT WITH 
THE COURSE OF CONDUCT BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND HIS CLIENT 
Based upon the testimony of Bryant Cragun (pages 62 and 63), 
the Panel found the following: 
1. That in late 1988, Mr. Bryant Cragun agreed with a 
Mr. Rick Yagi and Mr. Yagi would locate a public corporation for 
Mr. Cragun to purchase a majority interest. 
2. That in January and February of 1989, Mr. Cragun 
tendered via Mr. Yagi $25,000 to Respondent's trust account to 
purchase stock. 
3. That Cragun instructed Yagi that there would be no 
disbursements from the trust account until Mr. Cragun approved. 
4. That Mr. Cragun never vocalized or memorialized this 
disbursement condition to Respondent. 
5. That Respondent only attended one meeting with 
Messrs. Cragun and Yagi; and that Mr. Cragun instructed Respondent 
to assist Mr. Yagi in finding and purchasing stock in a public 
company. 
6. That Messrs. Cragun and Yagi and Respondent had 
participated in similar transactions; and that Mr. Yagi had a free 
10 
hand. 
7. That Mr. Yagi found a corporation he thought would 
suit Mr. Cragunfs purposes and instruction Respondent to tender the 
money to purchase this stock. 
Furthermore, testimony given at the October 15, 1992 hearing 
by Bryant Cragun corroborated the following: 
1. That Respondent and Messrs. Cragun and Yagi had only 
one meeting together and Mr. Cragun instructed respondent to assist 
Mr. Yagi. (Transcription of Hearing, page 63) 
2. That Respondent had worked on other transactions 
together that were handled similar to the transaction in question. 
(Transcription of Hearings, page 93) 
3. That Mr. Cragun never actually instructed Respondent 
not to disburse funds from his trust account to Mr. Yagi unless 
approved by Mr. Cragun. (Transcription of Hearings, pages 92 and 
93) 
4. That Messrs. Cragun and Yagi handled all aspects of 
the acquisition of stock. (Transcription of Hearings, pages 63-64) 
5. That Mr. Cragun was informed by Mr. Shupe, upon his 
request for return of such funds, that some of the monies had been 
spent by Mr. Yagi in acquiring stock in a public corporation. 
(Transcription of Hearings, pages 92-94) 
6. That Mr. Yagi used approximately $5,000 of the money 
deposited by Mr. Cragun in Respondent's trust account for personal 
expenses and expended approximately $14,000 toward the purchase of 
stock in a public corporation. (Transcription of Hearings, pages 
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75-77) 
7. That Mr. Yagi was sometimes given cash directly from 
Respondent's account. 
Based upon this testimony, the following is established: that 
Respondent, in one meeting with Mr. Bryant Cragun, was told to 
assist Mr. Yagi in finding stock in a public company; that Mr. Yagi 
had all further dealings with Mr. Cragun; that Mr. Yagi was clothed 
in the color of authority to act in Mr. Cragun*s name; that 
pursuant to instructions from Mr. Cragun (to assist Mr. Yagi) and 
from Mr. Yagi (to disburse monies from trust account to purchase 
stock) ; that this was consistent with prior dealings Respondent had 
with Messrs. Yagi and Cragun; and that monies were used to actually 
purchase stock in National Thorobred Company for Mr. Cragunfs 
benefit. 
Respondent has testified throughout all the hearing, which 
testimony was substantiated by Messrs. Cragun and Yagi, that Mr. 
Cragun1s funds were used to purchase stock in a public company, but 
that this stock was ultimately not to the liking of Mr. Cragun. 
Mr. Cragun then requested the return of his funds, which had been 
used, according to Respondent, congruent with the desires of Mr. 
Cragun. 
Of the $25,000 deposited with Respondent, $13,000 has been 
returned. The Panel's recommendation requires repayment of the 
remaining $12,000 within six (6) months of the Probationary Period. 
Respondent is ready to meet this requirement within the time frame 
set forth by the Panel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing Statement of Respondent, the statements 
of fact and the arguments set forth herein, Respondent respectfully 
urges to Court to consider that the Panel understood the 
seriousness of these matters; and in compiling and reviewing the 
testimony and evidence carefully considered and weighed the 
testimony and evidence before issuing its "Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and recommendations for Discipline. Respondent 
further requests the court to consider the reputations of the 
members of the Panel and Board of Commissioners: such individuals 
do not act wilfully, capriciously of erroneously in concert; and 
that this court affirm the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
recommendations for Discipline of the Panel and the Board. 
Dated this 14th day of June, 1993. 
^^a ^^ 
William R. Shupe, Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Respondent's Brief to Wendell K. Smith, Office of Bar 
Counsel, Utah State Bar, 645 South, 200 East, Salt Lake City 
84111. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In The Matter of 
the Complaint by 
KENT LINEBAUGH 
against 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE 
In The Matter of 
the Complaint by 
BAR COUNSEL 
against , 
WILLIAM SHUPE 
i FINDINGS OF FACT, 
• CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
i FOR DISCIPLINE 
l F-519 
i F-520 
This matter was initially set for June 24, 1992• No 
lay panel member was available and respondent had not received 
notice of hearing for matter F-519. A hearing was again held 
July 20, 1992, but neither bar counsel nor respondent had 
obtained trust checking account records from respondent's bank. 
On August 3, 1992, and October 15, 1992, Matters F-519 
and F-520 were heard by the Hearing Panel of the Board of Bar 
Commissioners, Harold L. Petersen, Chair, and Barbara K. Polich. 
By stipulation of all parties a lay panel member did not hear the 
matter. 
In each of these matters the respondent William Shupe 
appeared pro se while the Office of Bar Counsel was represented 
by Wendell K. Smith. At the October 15, 1992, hearing both Bar 
Counsel and Mr. Shupe were granted leave to file supplemental 
briefs. 
After hearing the evidence, receiving oral argument, 
and reviewing trial briefs from both parties and being otherwise 
fully advised, the panel makes the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations for Discipline. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISCIPLINE 
We recommend that the respondent William Shupe be 
placed on a one year probation with the following terms: 
1. Mr. Shupe shall reimburse his former client, Bryant 
D. Cragun, the total amount outstanding in client funds of 
$13,000. This reimbursement is to be made within six months of 
the start of the probationary period. 
2. During the probationary period Mr. Shupe shall 
maintain only a single business office. 
3. During the first six months of the probationary 
period Mr. Shupe shall accept no new Utah clients. 
4. All client or trust account monies received by Mr. 
Shupe shall be deposited in a trust account on which Mr. Shupe is 
not a sole signatory and if Mr. Shupe is a signatory, the 
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account shall be established and maintained in such a manner that 
more than one licensed attorney is required to sign checks to 
disperse money from such trust account. 
5. Mr. Shupe shall either complete 3 hours of 
Continuing Legal Education a portion of which must concern 
attorney trust accounts or Mr. Shupe shall take and pass the 
Multi-State Professional Responsibility Examination within the 
probationary period. 
FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING MATTER F-519 
1. Respondent William Shupe (hereinafter "respondent") 
was an associate for the law firm of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & 
Dunn (hereinafter "law firm") and at material times was an 
attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah and had been 
so for approximately two years. 
2. As an associate for the law firm, respondent 
accepted representation of Mr. Blaine Savage. 
3. Mr. Savage had previously had a business 
relationship with respondent's father-in-law leading to his 
retaining of the respondent and law firm. 
4. The terms of representation of Mr. Savage were that 
he would be billed at an hourly rate of $100 plus costs and 
expenses. 
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5. When the representation for which Mr. Savage had 
retained respondent and the law firm was completed, Mr. Savage 
paid to respondent what was termed by Mr. Savage as a "bonus for 
you" arising out of what Mr. Savage believed to be a good result 
from the representation. 
6. Respondent chose to interpret this payment as his 
own personal bonus and not the property of the law firm. 
7. Mr. Savage also intended this payment to be a 
"personal bonus." 
8. Respondent did not discuss his interpretation of 
the "bonus" with the law firm. 
9. Respondent acknowledged that he should have 
disclosed this payment to the law firm, however, that does not 
establish who was entitled to receive the funds. 
10. Respondent and law firm agreed that respondent 
would reimburse the law firm in the amount of the payment 
respondent received from Mr. Savage together with interest. That 
agreement was memorialized in the form of a promissory note which 
was replaced by subsequent promissory notes adding interest. 
11. The evidence was not clear nor convincing that a 
member of the public was either hurt or endangered as a result of 
the facts proven. 
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12. It has not been proved by clear or convincing 
evidence that respondent's conduct in this matter rose to the 
level of misappropriation, criminal conduct, dishonesty, 
misappropriation, theft, fraud, or deceit as set forth in the 
applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, including 1.13(b) and 
8.4(c) . 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN MATTER F-519 
We believe the evidence has not been clear nor 
convincing that this "bonusM was in fact a fee. Therefore, we do 
not recommend sanctions regarding this matter. 
FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING MATTER F-520 
Initially a default on this matter was entered, 
however, bar counsel agreed that evidence could be heard on the 
matter and presented evidence from Mr. Cragun that we find 
significant. 
1. During the latter part of 1988 Bryant D. Cragun 
(hereinafter ffCragun,f) agreed with Richard Yagi (hereinafter 
,fYagiff) that Yagi would make inquiries and find a publicly held 
corporation in which Cragun could purchase controlling interests. 
2. During January and February of 1989 Cragun 
deposited $25,000 in respondent's attorney trust account for the 
purpose of covering expenses and partial costs in acquiring the 
aforesaid publicly held corporation. 
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3. Cragun instructed Yagi that there should be no 
disbursements from the trust account until Cragun approved of the 
corporation Yagi might identify or propose for purchase. 
4. There is no evidence that Cragun relayed these 
instructions to Mr. Shupe regarding disbursements from the trust 
account. Mr. Cragun does not dispute respondent's testimony 
that he did not receive those instructions. Cragun testified 
that in the only meeting between Mr. Cragun and Mr. Shupe, Mr. 
Cragun instructed Mr. Shupe to assist Yagi in purchasing a 
corporation. This at least clothed Yagi with apparent authority 
and justified Shupefs compliance with instructions from Yagi. 
5. Mr. Cragun and Mr. Yagi had past dealings with each 
other wherein Mr. Yagi would find and arrange investments similar 
to the arrangement at issue here. 
6. During those previous dealings Mr. Yagi had been 
given somewhat of a "free hand" in acquiring stock. 
7. In addition to this transaction, Yagi was involved 
in numerous similar transactions both for Mr. Cragunf himself, 
and others. 
8. Mr. Yagi identified a corporation he believed would 
be acceptable to Mr. Cragun based on his past dealings with him. 
That corporation was The National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(hereinafter "National"). 
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9. A Mr. Schroder, who resided in New York State, 
owned or had access to National stock which Cragun could 
purchase. Yagi contacted Schroder and purchased some National 
stock. 
10. Mr. Yagi cannot now recall the specific amounts of 
money given to Mr. Schroder for the purchase of National stock. 
11. Mr. Yagi was not aware of any trust account monies 
being spent on anything other than expenses or stock. 
12. Somewhat troubling is Mr. Yagi's admission that he 
may have also purchased stock in this corporation for himself 
thinking that he might sell the stock to Mr. Cragun or if Mr. 
Cragun did not want it that he would keep the stock for himself. 
13. Respondent testified that it was his understanding 
that Cragun and Yagi were partners and that any instructions 
received from Yagi would be equal in authority as instructions 
received from Cragun. This is corroborated by Cragunfs earlier 
noted testimony. 
14. Respondent failed to obtain from Cragun or produce 
at trial any documents such as a retention letter setting forth 
who respondent's clients were and their duties and authority or 
setting forth the services which respondent would perform... 
-7-
15. Respondent did prepare opinion letters and other 
documents to facilitate stock purchase transactions for the 
benefit of Mr. Cragun. 
16. Respondent admits and the evidence is clear that 
respondent's record keeping with regard to his trust account was 
inadequate. Respondent further asserts that much of the 
documents reflecting what record keeping there was are lost. 
17. Of the $25,000 deposited in respondent's trust 
account, $6,000 was returned to Cragun. 
18. Yagi received approximately $5,000 for expenses. 
Shupe received a fee of $1,250. There were presented by the bar 
copies of checks totaling $11,250 all of which was paid to Yagi 
except $1,250.00 paid to YagiTs brother, Randy Yagi, for 
expenses. Records were not kept documenting the reasons for 
these disbursements. 
19. Respondent testified that all of the remaining 
amounts were used in the purchase of stock but the available 
documents do not substantiate this. Some National stock 
documents were produced but nothing shows what was paid nor how 
many shares were eventually purchased. 
20. On or about October 14, 1992, respondent paid an 
additional $7,000 to Mr. Cragun. He has agreed to pay an 
additional $13,000 to Cragun by December 31, 1992. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING MATTER F-520 
After considering the evidence, law, and applicable ABA 
standards for imposing sanctions, we believe a one year probation 
is appropriate. 
The duty violated in this matter we believe arose out 
of inexperience and mistakes in judgment which can be remedied. 
Mr. Cragun will be reimbursed all monies he deposited in 
respondent's trust account. 
We believe respondent's inadequate accounting of 
Cragun's money was a matter of incompetence, however, we do not 
believe it has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to be 
criminal conduct, dishonesty, intentional misappropriation, 
theft, fraud, or deceit. 
This is not to say that respondent's conduct was not 
serious nor that it does not need to be remedied by affirmative 
steps. Thus, we believe our recommendations appropriately 
address the conduct. Rule 1.13 requires complete records of 
account funds be kept and preserved for five years after the 
termination of representation. Mr. Shupe failed to comply with 
these requirements. 
In mitigation, it was stated that the respondent had 
gone through a divorce which had been emotionally devastating and 
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which may have clouded his judgment and interfered with his 
performance. 
In further mitigation is the fact that respondent has 
narrowed his practice to estate planning and has eliminated 
securities work from his practice. 
It is noted that the trust account deficiencies 
occurred while respondent was a sole practitioner having little 
experience or training in the management of trust accounts. 
Respondent is now an associate at a law firm in 
California where he can receive supervision in handling trust 
accounts and, more precisely, where his clients' funds can be 
deposited in an established law firm's trust account supervised 
by the partners of that firm. Potential injury to other clients 
will, therefore, be minimized by requiring respondent to use his 
new law firm's trust account instead of his own. 
We, therefore, recommend that respondent be placed on a 
one year probation with the following terms: 
1. Respondent will reimburse Mr. Cragun $13,000 in 
addition to the $13,000 which has already been returned to Mr. 
Cragun. This reimbursement will take place within six months of 
the start of the probationary period. 
2. During the probationary period, respondent will 
maintain only one business office. This will reduce the 
-10-
administrative complexities of maintaining two offices, one in 
Utah and one in California. Respondent has indicated that he 
intends to continually reduce his Utah client base and 
concentrate his practice in California. By making a single 
business office a term of this probation, it is not intended that 
respondent could not join a law firm in Utah and maintain his 
single business office in Utah, however, based on respondent's 
representations it is anticipated that his single business office 
will be in California. 
3. Respondent shall take on no new Utah clients during 
the period of this probation. This will assist respondent in 
simplifying his practice in a single office and reduce the 
complications of maintaining practices in two states. 
4. All client funds or other trust account funds will 
be deposited in a trust account of a law firm where all 
disbursements will require the signature of a licensed attorney 
other than respondent. Such attorney may be either a member of 
the California or Utah Bar but must be in good standing. 
5. During the probationary period, respondent will 
complete three hours of continuing legal education on ethics some 
of which must deal with attorney trust accounts. If due to 
unavailability of such course work he is unable to do so, 
respondent will take and pass the Multi-State Professional 
Responsibility Exam within the probationary period. 
-11-
DATED this ^ ^ day of November, 1992, 
Cs%5feS> 
old ^^.Pe'tersen, Chair 
- 1 2 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of November, 
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISCIPLINE was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
William Shupe 
at: 333 Civic Center Drive West 
Santa Ana, CA 92701 
and at: 48 West 300 South, Suite 1702 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Wendell K. Smith 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834 
Secretarv \) 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Wendell K. Smith, #3019 
Assistant Bar Counsel 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
645 South 200 East 
SLC, UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
Disciplinary Hearing Panel: 
Harold L. Petersen, Chair 
Barbara K. Polich 
In the Matter of the 
Complaint by 
KENT LINEBAUGH S 
BAR COUNSEL 
against 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE 
DOB: 08-29-54 
ADM: 10-15-84 
ORDER AFFIRMING 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
RECOMMENDATION OF 
DISCIPLINE 
F-519 & F-520 
Pursuant to Rule XII(e) of the Procedures of Discipline, the 
Board has reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline of the Disciplinary Hearing Panel. Tt 
hereby affirms those determinations, adopts them as its own, and 
incorporate* *-b«?m by reference into this oraer. 
Dated this 2fffv> day of3*A»>u*<ty , 1993. 
OF BAR COMMISSIONERS 
r£2 By; 
uryer ^r 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Order was mailed to William R. Shupe, Attorney at Law at 333 Civic 
Center Drive West, Santa Ana, CA 92701 on this } day of 
^^Jy\V-*LUA , 1993. f) 
